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Abstract  
 
In the very recent past, the Lombardy health care system - established on the quasi-market 
model – has caught the interest of researchers and politicians in different OECD 
countries
1. The merits of the model, compared to other Italian regional models, are the 
control of health care spending and the balanced budget, in a frame of good quality of 
services and patient choice. 
This paper stems from a literature review and tries to analyse the evolution of this regional 
system, the institutional path that brought to the implementation of the model, its 
theoretical basis, its merits and criticism. The period considered ranges from 1997, when 
the reform was enacted, to 2010. 
 
Keywords: quasi-market, health care system, Italian NHS reforms 
 
Jel classification: I18 
                                                 
1 See for example the Wall Street Journal, Tuesday, April 13, 2010, R2   1
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
In the Italian and international literature, the “Lombardy model” is always mentioned for its 
uniqueness, compared to the other Italian regional systems (Mapelli, 2000; Anessi Pessina et 
al., 2004; France et al. 2005). Indeed, with the regional law 31/1997 the legislator set a quasi 
market model, privileging the separation between purchaser and provider of health care and 
patient free choice. This analysis tries to investigate, with the help of a literature review, the 
main features of the Lombardy health care reform in 1997, and the evolution of the model in 
the following years. 
In order to offer a complete perspective, the study embodies sources having different origins: 
scientific articles from national and international peer review journals, essays concerning 
specific aspects of the Lombardy health care system, legislative acts and Reports on the 
Italian National Health Service (INHS)
2. Original data are shown in section four where the 
organization of the model is discussed. The analysis is built from an economic prospective, 
hence aspects such as the theoretical framework of the quasi market (QM) model, the 
financing criteria, the problem of incomplete information in a free choice context, are 
investigated. Only health care services are examined, with no regards to social services. The 
different steps that brought to the quasi-market choice are considered from the juridical, 
institutional and theoretical point of view, the main features of the model are highlighted as 
well as its merits and criticisms.  
After this brief introduction, next section presents and analyses the health care reforms of the 
nineties in the Italian NHS, up to the process of devolution, the third section illustrates the 
main theoretical aspects of the QM setting according to the literature, while the fourth section 
explains, with the support of original data, the organization of the Lombardy model, the way 
it is financed, the role of its stakeholders as well as its merits and criticisms. Before the 
conclusions, the fifth section examines the merits and criticism of the model, as they emerge 
from the analysis. Despite the authors’ efforts at providing a through vision of the Lombardy 
health care system, some aspects, mainly the technical ones (i.e. waiting list for hospital 
access), have been neglected, due to the choice to focus on structural aspects.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2 Sources are mainly from national origin, due to the specificity of the issue.   2
2. THE MAIN REFORMS OF ITALIAN NHS 
 
 
During the nineties the Italian NHS, on the basis of the 1991 British NHS  reform,  was 
deeply reformed by different regulatory acts to promote managerialsm, regionalization, and to 
introduce competition criteria in the internal market (Fattore, 1999). These changes, briefly 
described herewith, prepared the field for the regional law 31/1997 and the setting of the 
internal market within the Lombardy health-care system. With the decree laws 502/92 and 
503/93, the Local Health Units (LHUs), which represented the third level of Government after 
the Central Authority and the Regions, were transformed into public firms. General Managers 
were still appointed by the Region, but each LHU followed a management accounting and its 
own profit. LHUs larger hospitals were required to become independent hospitals, able to 
contract with LHUs for number and kind of services, and to compete among themselves and 
with accredited private hospitals. In order to improve regional autonomy, social contribution, 
till then devoted to national Fund, became a source of regional financing. The financing law 
of 1995 introduced the use of DRG as prospective payment for hospital activity. This method 
was functional to the new rules of the Italian NHS, such as the separation between provider 
and purchaser (Taroni 1997; Falcitelli and Langiano, 2004). The next decree law (446/97) 
established more autonomy in the regional health care financing: together with social 
contributions, which were replaced by a production tax (IRAP), a percentage of the personal 
income tax (IRPEF) was committed to regional financing. The 1999 health care reform 
(decree law 229/1999) had been designed to stress the main objectives of the Italian NHS in 
view of the imminent process of devolution, which started in 2000
3. Specifically, it reaffirmed 
the original goals of universalism, comprehensiveness, and public funding of the INHS 
(France and Taroni, 2005), and highlighted the separate functions of central Government and 
Regions. With the decree law 56/2000, fiscal federalism was enacted, the national Fund was 
formally abolished, Regions were required to autonomously finance their Health Services and 
a new balancing Fund was created in order to compensate for cross-regional differences in 
fiscal capacity
4.  
                                                 
3 For a brief overview of the principal steps that transformed  the Italian NHS and introduced the devolution 
process see Caruso, 2009, for an in-depth examination of  the fiscal federalism reform, see Dirindin and Pagano, 
2001 
4The National Health Fund has only been formally abolished. Actually, in 2005 it was still active and transferred 
part of the resources directly to the regions, driving other resources from the newly set balancing Fund, whose 
purpose was to redistribute financial flows from the richest to the poorest regions. The balancing Fund is 
financed by value added tax (VAT) revenues, the amount of which is set annually by the Government with the 
aim of ensuring that all regions have adequate financial resources for the minimum health care levels. For an 
analysis of the “missed fiscal reform”, updated to 2006, see Caroppo and Turati (2007), pages 65 and following. 
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In 1997, Lombardy was the first Region to apply the decrees 502/92 and 517/93, with the 
setting of the quasi market model. The main features of the Lombardy health care system are 
the following (regional law 31/1997): 
–  Separation between health care purchasers and providers; 
–  Competition between public and private accredited providers in the presence of a 
third part payer; 
–  Patients’ free choice between providers. 
Furthermore, the principle of subsidiarity as a way of sharing competencies and activities 
between private actors, public sector and civil society (persons, families, and non-profit 
organizations), is deeply stressed (Colombo, 2008). 
 
 
 
3. THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF QUASI MARKET IN HEALTH CARE 
AND ITS APPLICATION IN LOMBARDY 
 
The theoretical principle of the quasi market model consists of introducing competition into 
the system, in order to improve the quality of services and to control health care expenditure 
(Oliver and Mossialos, 2005; Le Grand, 2007). Different authors consider the multiplicity of 
providers - both public and private accredited -, and the presence of an independent third part 
payer, as the most common features of QM models (Compagnoni, 2005; Longo, 2006). 
Purchasers have strong incentives to limit provisions by providers, while providers aim at 
increasing volumes and quality to attract patients. In this way, the possible distortions 
embedded in the publicly run systems should be avoided, or at least reduced (Le Grand, 1999; 
Anessi Pessina et al., 2004). The basic intuition that the public sector can be the best insurer 
(granting financing and universal coverage), but not necessarily the best producer, involves 
very marginal, if any, delivering power for the Government and its territorial extensions 
(Petretto, 2009)
5. The widespread, albeit not binding, use of fixed tariffs, leads to a 
competition on quality
6, while the negotiation on volume and typology of services between 
                                                 
5 Petretto defines QM as a quite widespread specification of the contractual model, which is considered a variant 
of the mixed organizational model. Specifically, the author identifies three typologies of organizational models 
within industrialized countries: i) public model, equity oriented, financed by general taxation , with whole 
coverage; ii) private insurance model, such as USA pre-reform model, with private insurers and private 
providers, iii) mixed model, with essential levels of care managed by Government and mutual organizations for 
integrative services. This model, which can extend the coverage to the whole population, is widespread in most 
European countries, with different formulations, among which the contractual model. 
6 Not all the health care systems with patient choice referring to QM settings have fix payment for services. 
Some studies carried on in the UK and in the USA, show the difficulty in reaching homogeneous results when 
the prices vary. The presence of many variables (capacity of evaluating separately price and/or quality, 
heterogeneity of qualitative variables, presence or not of a third part payer, mix of financing subjects) makes the 
analysis of the results difficult to perform (Chernew et al., 1998; Escarce et al., 1999; Propper et al, 2002; 
Propper et al., 2004).   4
third part payers and providers ensures transparency in the financing criteria and introduces 
planning as a tool of controlling health care expenditure. The mechanism works in the 
presence of strong budget constraints, enforced by tariff caps in cases where services and/or 
accesses override the planned budget. Patient’s free choice is granted - from the supply side - 
by a network of different providers. The demand side is more controversial on this point, due 
to the problem of incomplete and asymmetric information, which does not allow a rational 
choice. Some authors suggest the presence of a subject (the general practitioner, a mutual 
insurer, or a kind of pilot figure, such as the Patient Care Advisors in the British NHS), with 
the specific role of empowering the patients – especially those in lower socioeconomic 
condition - in their free choice (Dixon and Le Grand 2006; Petretto, 2009). 
Criticisms to the QM model are mainly directed to the use of fixed tariffs for inpatient 
services (Propper et. al, 2006). Many authors suggest that their use can introduce some 
distortions, such as cream-skimming, cherry picking, voluntary up-coding and skimping 
(Jones and Cullis, 1996; Ellis, 1998; Anessi Pessina et al. 2004; Fattore and Torbica, 2006; 
Petretto, 2009; Berta et al., 2010). These phenomena, as well as the bargaining on volume and 
typology of access, require a strong regulatory function on hospital activity, which in some 
cases is performed by ad hoc independent Authorities, the problem being then related to high 
transaction costs.  
According to this theoretical framework, in 1997 Lombardy was the only Italian Region to 
choose the separation between purchasers and providers, and to support patient free choice, 
subscribing to the principle that “money follows the patient”. The uniqueness of the 
Lombardy model is often mentioned in national and international literature. One of the first 
attempts to analyze the interregional differences after the 502/92 decree law, indicates 
Lombardy as the only Region to show hiven off hospitals
7 by the end of nineties (Mapelli, 
2000). The same opinion is expressed by Anessi Pessina et al.( 2004), who consider the 
Lombard health care system as a “notable exception” among all the regional systems. Mattei 
(2007) investigates the three Regions who accepted to undertake a reform during the nineties, 
Emilia Romagna, Tuscany and Lombardy. About the latter, the author focuses on the fusion 
process of LHUs (84 in 1995, 44 in 1995, 15 in 2005) and on their role of third part payers 
and contracting subjects against providers. France and Taroni (2005) underline the “almost 
total separation between purchasing and provision”, Boni (2007), as well as France et al. 
(2005) argues about the peculiar choice of Lombardy in electing a separate model. Caroppo 
and Turati (2007) show a comparisons of different regional models based on funding, 
structural and organizational activity: in 2002 Lombardy distinguishes from the other Regions 
for having only 9% of beds in LHU’s hospitals, compared to a maximum of 88% in Molise. 
From 1997 to 2003, Lombardy LHU’s hospitals have been reduced from 93 to 1, while public 
                                                 
7 Although the 1992 reform included all the health care services, authors’ interest is often focussed on hospitals’ 
main changes.   5
firm hospitals have been increased from 16 to 29. In the authors’ regional health systems 
classification, based on the competitiveness within each, Lombardy is at the first place. Even 
with regard to the implementation of the DRG prospective payment, Lombardy is the first 
Region to adopt it, in part due to its hospitals’ internal organization and accounting system 
(Agnello et al., 2003; Fattore and Torbica, 2006). 
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4. THE STRUCTURE OF THE LOMBARDY HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 
 
4.1 Main steps to set the model 
 
With the regional law 31/1997, the Lombardy health care system was reformed and became 
QM oriented, with the following internal organization (reg.law 31/1997): the Region raises 
and manages funds for health care, plans activities in cooperation with LHUs and monitors 
the delivery of minimum levels, which are set by the central Government. LHUs manage 
health care on the territory, through smaller units called Districts, and contracts volume and 
typology of services with providers. Providers - public, not for profit or private (accredited) - 
compete on production following the same rules. The newly set model empowers the Region 
with insurance and funding functions, the LHUs with programming and purchasing power, 
while production is performed by providers. Steps to set the Lombardy model implies i) the 
reorganization of the hospital network, ii) the definition of criteria for crediting the hospitals 
and iii) the arrangement of financing criteria. As already mentioned, from 1997 to 2003, 
LHUs hospitals diminish from 93 to 1, while public hospital firms increase from 16 to 29. A 
consistent number of privately owned hospitals and not for profit ones enter the system 
through an accreditation process. For the financial setting, the national rules provide that 
regions are funded and pay LHUs by capitation to cover minimum levels, letting each Region 
manage the internal distribution
8. Next sections will examine in depth the different aspects of 
the Lombardy model. Specifically, section 4.2 describes the financing criteria and resource 
allocation of health care expenditure, section 4.3 develops the issue about the different roles 
of Region and LHUs, while section 4.4 shows some data of structure and activity. 
 
 
4.2 Financial criteria, resource allocation and health care expenditure 
 
In the national framework, the decree law 56/2000 introduces the process of fiscal federalism 
with the abolition of the National Health Fund
9, regional autonomy for funding health care 
and the creation of a balancing Fund to compensate for cross-regional differences in fiscal 
capacity. 
The sources to finance the regional systems are: i) a percentage of the value added tax (VAT) 
revenues, which is dropped directly into the balancing Fund, ii) the production tax (IRAP), 
which represented a regional source since 1998, iii) some other minor voices, such as a 
percentage of personal income taxation, called IRPEF, and a tax on gasoline consumption 
                                                 
8 While writing this paper, it has just been approved by the Italian Government a new rule for heath care 
financing, based on standard costs (see AGENAS, 2011). 
9 For the abolition of the National Health Fund, see note 4. 
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(Dirindin and Pagano, 2000; France et al., 2005). Own source revenues covers almost 45% of 
regional expenditure, although there is still considerable variety among Regions. As shown in 
table 1, in 2003, excluding VAT and equalization process, Lombardy was at the first place for 
fiscal capacity, with a coverage capacity for current expenditure of 69% against a value of 
26% for Calabria, at the bottom place. Adding VAT revenues, Lombardy reaches 87% of 
coverage and Calabria 51%, but, after passing through the equalization mechanism, the 
situation appears completely overturned: Calabria, driving sources from the balancing Fund, 
is able to cover almost 91% of its health care need, while Lombardy, who runs for solidarity, 
remains at the same coverage level, 87% (Caruso, 2009).   
 
Table 1: Fiscal coverage by regions* : years 2001-2003 
 
Source: Adaptation from Caruso 2009, pag.121 
* Autonomous regions excluded 
 
 
In addition to the fiscal revenues, regional money could be transferred from other public 
sector units such as Government’s administrations and municipalities. LHUs can also drive   8
resources from their own activities (copayment on secondary care and pharmaceuticals, plus 
some chargeable activities). Each Region decides autonomously whether to increase the 
production (IRAP) and/or personal income taxation (IRPEF) share, as well as copayment, to 
cover its health care deficit. Lombardy is one of the few Regions that, during the last years, 
made use of all these tools and strictly controlled health care expenditure in order to break 
even. Recently revised data from the Ministry of Health show little negative per capita 
balance for the year 2005, almost balanced for 2006 and positive for 2007 and 2008, as shown 
in table 2. Compared to other regions, especially Lazio and the southern ones, Lombardy has 
been able to control its balance. These results have been achieved without any Government 
intervention: actually Lombardy is one of the very few regions, together with Aosta Valley, 
Friuli and Bolzano, to be excluded from ex post funding plans since 2003.  
 
Table 2: Annual regional balance for health care services: years 2005-2008 
 REGIONS 
2005 2006 2007 2008 
 
Balance 
(millions 
euro) 
Per 
capita 
(euro) 
Balance 
(millions 
euro) 
Per 
capita 
(euro) 
Balance 
(millions 
euro) 
Per 
capita 
(euro) 
Balance 
(millions 
euro) 
Per 
capita 
(euro) 
PIEMONTE 0.874  0  -7.174 -2 30.690 7  2.621  1
V.  AOSTA  -13.914  -113 -13.517 -109 -13.527 -108 -15.370  -123
LOMBARDIA  -14.285 -2  -4.325 -0 9.810 1 21.177  2
PA*  BOLZANO 28.061  59 25.272 52 22.403 46 15.039  31
PA* TRENTO  -2.840  -6  -14.072 -28 -8.478 -17  -2.125  -4
VENETO  -114.098  -24 71.385 15 75.417 16 16.175  3
FRIULI 27.169  23  18.297 15 39.476 32  7.615  6
LIGURIA  -253.757  -159 -100.119 -62 -141.810 -88 -109.478  -68
E. ROMAGNA  -16.303  -4  -38.418 -9 25.926 6  7.191  2
TOSCANA -14.986  -4  -120.619 -33 42.244 12  39.272  11
UMBRIA -8.236  -10  -40.647 -47 6.886 8  16.700  19
MARCHE -18.297  -12  -38.953 -25 15.022 10  18.808  12
LAZIO  -1,737.346  -330 -1,970.862 -365 -1,613.931 -292 -1,638.804  -297
ABRUZZO -240.919  -185  -140.414 -107 -151.467 -115  -87.795  -67
MOLISE  -139.375  -433 -58.787 -183 -66.630 -208 -73.198  -228
CAMPANIA  -1,792.586  -310 -761.088 -131 -863.694 -149 -496.630  -86
PUGLIA  -411.945  -101 -169.904 -42 -312.846 -77 -414.395  -102
BASILICATA  -42.762  -72 -22.100 -37 -17.588 -30 -25.804  -44
CALABRIA -79.106  -39  -34.933 -17 -125.235 -63  -113.585  -57
SICILIA  -563.147  -112 -932.453 -186 -573.879 -114 -331.751  -66
SARDEGNA -327.078  -198  -129.928 -78 -22.483 -14  -37.798  -23
                 
ITALY  -5,734.877  -98 -4,483.359 -76 -3,643.693 -61 -3,202.135  -54
Source: elaboration of data from Ministry of Health 
*PA: Provincia Autonoma: Autonomous territorial Authority   9
Strict control of public health expenditure is one of the policies enacted by the Lombardy 
government to control the budget. During the last decade per capita values have been below 
the national average, as shown by different studies (Caruso 2009; Jommi and Lecci, 2008) 
and confirmed by data reported in table 3 for the years 2006 – 2009. Interregional differences 
are still pronounced: northern regions – except Lombardy and Veneto– show higher values, 
while southern ones spend less then the national average. 
 
 
Table 3: Public per capita expenditure at regional level*, year 2006- 2009 – euro 
 
REGIONS 2006  2007  2008 2009
              
PIEMONTE 1,715  1,766  1,828 1,880
AOSTA 1,971  1,969  2,058 2,089
LOMBARDIA 1,614  1,685  1,726 1,763
PA BOLZANO  2,104  2,170  2,232 2,170
PA TRENTO  1,783  1,849  1,926 2,028
VENETO 1,655  1,688  1,726 1,782
FRIULI 1,639  1,770  1,885 1,961
LIGURIA 1,837  1,925  1,970 2,024
E. ROMAGNA  1,739  1,795  1,845 1,903
TOSCANA 1,708  1,750  1,804 1,846
UMBRIA 1,683  1,709  1,761 1,798
MARCHE 1,598  1,635  1,677 1,750
LAZIO 1,982  1,968  1,981 1,974
ABRUZZO 1,691  1,770  1,773 1,778
MOLISE 1,841  1,941  2,030 2,080
CAMPANIA 1,592  1,674  1,724 1,737
PUGLIA 1,537  1,657  1,736 1,747
BASILICATA 1,542  1,642  1,719 1,750
CALABRIA 1,492  1,712  1,678 1,732
SICILIA 1,675  1,658  1,645 1,671
SARDEGNA 1,588  1,627  1,742 1,797
              
TOTAL 1,682  1,740  1,782 1,816
Source: elaboration of data from Ministry of Health 
*Interregional mobility not included 
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Tab 4a: Public, out of pocket, total health expenditure as a percentage of GDP – years 2001-2003 
 
REGIONS AND 
GEOGRAPHICAL 
AREAS 
2001 2002  2003 
 
Pub. 
 
Out of 
pocket.
 
Tot 
 
Pub. 
 
Out of 
pocket.
 
Tot 
 
Pub. 
 
Out of 
pocket. 
 
Tot 
                          
Lombardy 4.43  1.73 6.15 4.61 1.78 6.38 4.4 1.76  6.17 
Northern reg.  4.91  1.84 6.75 5.07 1.91 6.98 5.04 1.91  6.95 
Central reg.  5.71  1.82 7.53 5.7 1.85 7.55 5.86 1.85  7.7 
Southern reg.  8.51  2.07 10.6 8.65 2.1 10.7 8.68 2.13  10.8 
Italy 5.95  1.89 7.84 6.07 1.94 8.01 6.1 1.95  8.04 
                             
Source: Istat, national accounts 
 
 
Tab 4b: Public, out of pocket, total health expenditure as a percentage of GDP – years 2003-2006 
 
REGIONS AND 
GEOGRAPHICAL 
AREAS 
2004 2005 2006 
 
Pub. 
 
Out of 
pocket.
 
Tot 
 
Pub. 
 
Out of 
pocket.
 
Tot 
 
Pub. 
 
Out of 
pocket. 
 
Tot 
                          
Lombardy 4.69  1.75 6.44 4.82 1.75 6.58 4.97 1.73  6.71 
Northern reg.  5.32  1.88 7.19 5.46 1.87 7.33 5.56 1.86  7.42 
Central reg.  6.2  1.81 8 6.44 1.81 8.25 6.61 1.79  8.4 
Southern reg.  9.16  2.09 11.3 9.67 2.09 11.8 9.78 2.05  11.8 
Italy 6.43  1.91 8.34 6.68 1.91 8.59 6.8 1.89  8.69 
                             
Source: Istat, national accounts 
 
Tables 4a/b report Lombardy health expenditure over the regional GDP, disaggregated into 
public and private (out of pocket) share, and the average levels of each geographical areas, 
respectively North, Center and South of Italy. Even if caution should be paid in such 
comparisons, due to the still pronounced interregional differences in productivity levels, these 
results reveal the efforts of Lombardy Government in controlling health care expenditure. 
Such restrains could however provoke a shift toward the private access. Table 5 shows health 
expenditure of households as a percentage of total health expenditure, by regions, during the 
years 2001-2006. Lombardy values are quite above the national benchmark during the whole 
period, and collocate this region at the second place for private health expenditure share, after 
Friuli Venetia Giulia. During the last three years, a trend inversion is shown, which is 
common to almost all the regions. 
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Tab 5: Health expenditure of households as a percentage of total health expenditure by region - Years 
2001-2006  
 
REGIONS AND 
GEOGRAPHICAL 
AREAS 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
    
Piemonte    27.93 27.93 27.58 26.00 25.30 24.77
Valle d'Aosta   23.80  23.87 24.30 21.96  21.90 21.21
Lombardia    28.05 27.84 28.61 27.19 26.64 25.85
Trentino-Alto  Adige    23.21 23.07 22.18 21.10 21.50 20.89
Veneto    26.32 26.81 26.43 25.25 24.26 23.66
Friuli-Venezia  Giulia    28.40 28.56 28.93 27.40 27.85 28.24
Liguria    22.81 24.10 23.47 22.40 21.40 21.42
Emilia-Romagna    28.80 28.45 28.44 27.26 26.98 26.81
Toscana    24.22 24.55 24.82 23.61 23.49 22.98
Umbria    20.87 20.44 20.33 19.55 19.36 18.98
Marche    24.04 24.14 24.67 23.69 23.05 21.31
Lazio    24.56 25.10 23.82 22.11 21.07 20.77
Abruzzo    19.38 19.16 18.31 18.69 17.36 17.19
Molise    19.90 19.97 20.19 19.72 17.30 18.16
Campania    19.14 19.56 19.54 18.08 17.33 17.58
Puglia    20.86 21.29 21.82 20.59 19.46 18.69
Basilicata    17.75 17.41 17.06 16.20 15.66 15.06
Calabria    20.94 21.36 21.88 21.44 20.33 20.21
Sicilia    18.95 18.06 18.24 16.97 16.46 15.18
Sardegna    18.69 18.59 18.57 17.89 17.57 17.64
NORTH 27.32 27.37 27.43 26.10 25.55 25.06
CENTRE 24.13 24.47 23.98 22.58 21.91 21.37
SOUTH 19.57 19.56 19.67 18.60 17.78 17.35
ITALY 24.14 24.25 24.21 22.95 22.25 21.77
               
 
Source: Istat. national accounts 
 
With regards to resource allocation, given the rule that each Region decides how to distribute 
the total funding set by the Government to cover the essential levels, the Lombardy internal 
criteria to finance each LHU are the following: 75% of capitation fee is based on previous 
expenses, 16% on demographic criteria (8% over 65, 8% chronic diseases), 9% on 
geographical criteria (Regole, 2009). Despite the progress in reducing the share of “historical 
expenditure” from 100% to 75%, this principle is nonetheless criticized for the risk of 
reproducing possible inappropriateness
10. Consistently with the separate model, LHUs are 
paid by capitation plus no chargeable functions (i.e. research activity), while providers are 
financed by LHUs on a fee for service basis: DRG for hospital discharges, and tariffs for 
outpatient services. Capitation fee is thought to cover essential levels and in Lombardy it 
funds approximately 84% of total health care expenditure. Few other functions, specifically 
                                                 
10 In Italy the debate on the necessity to fund health care with parameters different from the past expenditure, has 
been going on for many years and it is still far from being resolved (Turati, 2003, Mapelli, 2007, AGENAS, 
2009).   12
social services, administrative costs for managing regional Fund, research activity, LHUs 
extra budget funding (in case of demand exceeding the supply, or specific emergency 
situation) are financed directly by the regional Fund (Brenna, 2007; Regole, 2009). Table 6 
shows the resource allocation among macro areas to cover minimum levels (year 2009). 
Notice that mobility - the balance flaw between region and out of region admissions - has a 
quite significant impact and is frequently used to covers deficits between health care costs and 
revenues. 
 
Table 6: Resource allocation to cover minimum levels (million euro) – year 2009 
 
Level of care  Resources (million euro)  Planned incidence 
1 –  prevention  856  5.5% 
2 – territorial care  7.941  At least  51% 
3 – hospital care  6.773  Up to 43.5% 
    
TOTAL  15.570 100% 
Active mobility* (balance)  480   
 16.050   
Source: Regole 2009, Delibera n. VIII/501, del 26/11/2008 
* Mobility is the balance flow between region and out of region admissions for, respectively, non-resident and 
resident patients. 
 
4.3 Internal organization and actor’s role 
 
Although the Lombardy health care system is quasi market oriented, two kinds of problems 
seem to have inhibited the concept of free competition during these years. Both of them can 
be related to the role of the Region and its difficulty in releasing power to the LHUs, and each 
characterizes a temporal phase of the newly set model. Very briefly, during the first time, 
from 1998 to 2004, free competition is enacted but the Region intervenes with ex post funding 
toward those public hospitals that override their budget. The second phase is introduced by a 
legislative act – the regional decree 12287/03 – which, in an attempt to control the 
phenomenon of overrunning by public hospitals, ends up with completely frustrating the 
concept of free competition and still affirms the Region’s right of allocating resources. A 
deeper examination will help to understand the issue. Starting with the first stage, the regional 
law 31/1997 and the subsequent regional decree 34437/98
11 defined precisely the work-
sharing between Region and LHUs and established that each LHU should contract with the 
                                                 
11 Specifically, the law 31/1997 establishes the division of responsibilities, while DGR 34437/1998 defines the 
contracting power of LHUs. 
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hospitals the number and typology of admissions, eventually imposing tariff caps for those 
admissions exceeding the planned number. Of course the same rules should be granted for 
accredited and public providers. In fact, at least up to 2004, it was the Region who decided 
how to allocate resources between providers, without letting the LHUs the contracting power 
that would guarantee free competition (Anessi Pessina et al., 2004; Brenna, 2007; Boni, 2007; 
Bordignon and Hamui, 2007; Caroppo and Turati, 2007).  
 
Figure 1: Region and LHUs functions – regional law 31/1997, DGR 34437/1998 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Brenna, 2007 
 
As shown in figure 1, according to the law, the Region provides each LHU the capitation fees 
to cover minimum levels, then each LHU contracts with providers and performs its 
institutional function of Programming Acquiring and Controlling (PAC). Strict timing in 
approving public hospital’s budget should be respected, and no inference from Region should 
be admitted. Unfortunately, the law 31/1997 also allows the Region to intervene with ex-post 
funding for those public hospitals which override their budget. The result is that, at least up to 
2004, tariff caps have been applied mainly to private hospitals, while public hospitals which 
overrode their budget were rescued by the Region funding. This framework raises three 
controversial issues: the distort incentives for public hospitals due to ex post funding, the 
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discrimination against private accredited ones
12, the lack of transparency in financial flows, 
since ex post funding drives resources directly from the regional Fund, bypassing the 
capitation fee. Figure 2 shows that the factual role of each LHU is that of transferring 
resources within an allocation already established by the Region. 
 
Figure 2: Role of LHU in hospital planning before DGR 12287/03 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Brenna, 2007 
 
Possibly in an attempt to grant the LHUs the role they claimed, the regional decree 12287 of 
4
th march 2003 set new rules for regulating the contracts between LHUs and hospitals: tariffs, 
typology and number of admission should be established at the beginning of the year. Indeed 
this new rule, instead of empowering LHUs with contracting power, enforced the idea of an 
overall allocation between providers, with no space for free competition (Brenna, 2007; Boni, 
2007). The latter phase of the Lombardy health care system is characterized by a resource 
allocation set on historical expenditure, without possibility of contracting. The system ensures 
a good control of health care expenditure, but competition is highly penalized. 
                                                 
13This fact led to a legal act brought by private hospitals against the Region, which ended with the commitment 
to refund the formers. 
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4.4 Some data of structures and activity 
 
The Lombardy health care system has to be distinguished from other regional systems for the 
number of residents and the volume of activity, as highlighted here below. It provides health 
care to 9.5 million people, which is almost 1/6 of national population. The age distribution is 
not very dissimilar from the national one, with the exception of the extremes - the youngest 
and the oldest categories – a bit below the national average (table 7). For ageing people, 
considering the relatively high presence of 65-74 people and the value in absolute terms, this 
category requires an adequate supply of services. 
 
Table 7: Resident population - year 2007 
 
REGIONS    Age 0-14   Age  15-44   Age 45-64  Age  65-74   More than 75    Total
Piemonte                 12.5                 37.9                 26.9                 12.0                 10.7          4,352,828 
Valle d'Aosta                 13.4                 39.6                 26.6                 10.7                   9.7             124,812 
Lombardia                 13.8                 40.5                 26.1                 10.8                   8.9          9,545,441 
 Bolzano                 16.9                 42.2                 23.9                   9.1                   7.9             487,673 
Trento                 15.4                 39.8                 25.9                   9.5                   9.4             507,030 
Veneto                 14.0                 40.6                 26.0                 10.2                   9.2          4,773,554 
Friuli Venezia Giulia                 12.1                 37.7                 27.3                 11.7                 11.1          1,212,602 
Liguria                 11.2                 35.1                 27.1                 13.3                 13.4          1,607,878 
Emilia Romagna                 12.6                 38.6                 26.0                 11.4                 11.4          4,223,264 
Toscana                 12.3                 37.9                 26.5                 11.6                 11.7          3,638,211 
Umbria                 12.6                 38.2                 25.9                 11.5                 11.9             872,967 
Marche                 13.1                 38.9                 25.4                 11.2                 11.4          1,536,098 
Lazio                 13.9                 40.7                 26.0                 10.5                   8.9          5,493,308 
Abruzzo                 13.3                 40.1                 25.2                 10.6                 10.7          1,309,797 
Molise                 13.1                 39.8                 25.1                 10.9                 11.2             320,074 
Campania                 17.3                 43.7                 23.5                   8.4                   7.1          5,790,187 
Puglia                 15.5                 42.3                 24.6                   9.4                   8.2          4,069,869 
Basilicata                 14.2                 41.4                 24.3                 10.4                   9.6             591,338 
Calabria                 15.0                 42.2                 24.3                   9.6                   8.8          1,998,052 
Sicilia                 15.9                 41.7                 24.2                   9.5                   8.6          5,016,861 
Sardegna                 12.7                 42.5                 26.9                   9.8                   8.2          1,659,443 
Italia                 14.1                 40.4                 25.6                 10.5                   9.5         59,131,287 
Source: Ministry of Health, on Istat data 
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Hospital care – The publicly funded separate model has encouraged the presence of different 
institutional typologies of providers, which can be grouped into three main categories: i) the 
public hospital firms, ii) the IRCCS (Istituto di Ricovero e Cura a Carattere Scientifico), 
whose activity is partly devolved to research, and whose ownership can be public, private or 
not for profit, iii) the privately owned – profit and not for profit - accredited hospitals, which 
offer their services to the regional system. According to the last update (2007), public hospital 
firms are 29, each managing several local hospitals (97), private accredited structures are 73, 
while IRCCS are 23; including other minor categories, mainly private non accredited, the 
total number of hospital providers - among public, not for profit and private subjects - 
amounts to 220, as shown in table 8. 
 
Table 8: different typologies of providers, Lombardy, year 2007 
 
Public hospitals 
firms* 
 
Private accredited 
hospitals 
IRCCS Other 
providers 
Tot providers 
97 73  23  27  220 
Source: elaboration of data from Ministry of health 
* total number of providers grouped in 29 firms 
 
For what is concerning beds supply, they are grouped into two main categories: beds for acute 
care and beds for rehabilitation and long stay.  
Table 9 shows the beds’ distribution among public hospitals and private accredited ones (rates 
over 10,000 inhabitants, year 2005). For aggregate values (first column) Lombardy 
distribution is very similar to the northern benchmark. The peculiarity of the Lombardy model 
emerges when analysing disaggregated data. This region presents a higher concentration of 
private accredited beds (8.98) if compared to the North area (6.79), and even if compared to 
the national value (7.98). A deeper investigation on the concentration of private accredited 
beds among Italian regions shows a very heterogeneous framework (table 10). Lombardy 
presents 22.4 % of private accredited beds, against a Northern average of 17 %. However, 
central and southern regions present values of respectively 23.61 % and 23.67 %. Not 
surprisingly private providers are specialized in rehabilitation and long stay, where financial 
risk is lower and there is boundary for profits. 
 
 
 
 
   17
 
 
 
Table 9: Public and private "accredited" hospital beds per 10,000 inhabitants by region - Year 2005 
  
 
REGIONS AND 
GEOGRAPHICAL 
AREAS 
 
Total 
 
Public Hospitals 
 
Private accredited hospitals 
Total
 
For 
acute 
care 
For long
stay and 
rehabilitation
Total
For 
acute
care
 
For long 
stay and  
rehabilitation 
 
Total 
For 
acute
care
For long
stay and 
rehabilitation
               
Piemonte   38.73 30.13  8.60 30.47 26.16 4.31  8.27  3.97 4.30
Valle d'Aosta   33.71 33.71  0.00 33.71 33.71 0.00  0.00  0.00 0.00
Lombardia   40.11 33.73  6.38 31.13 27.59 3.54  8.98  6.14 2.84
Trentino              44.15 35.19  8.96 36.24 33.28 2.96  7.91  1.91 6.00
Bolzano 42.28 36.39  5.90 35.95 34.66 1.29  6.34  1.73 4.61
Trento 45.94 34.04  11.90 36.52 31.96 4.56  9.42  2.08 7.34
Veneto                           37.62 31.98  5.64 35.32 30.33 4.99  2.30  1.65 0.65
Friuli-Venezia Giulia     36.25 34.27  1.97 31.57 30.13 1.44  4.67  4.14 0.53
Liguria                          40.44 37.22  3.22 39.71 36.93 2.77  0.73  0.28 0.45
Emilia-Romagna            43.46 34.69  8.77 35.18 30.32 4.87  8.28  4.38 3.90
Toscana                          36.56 33.70  2.86 31.60 30.28 1.32  4.97  3.42 1.54
Umbria                           30.73 29.27  1.46 28.26 27.14 1.12  2.47  2.13 0.34
Marche                           38.90 33.71  5.20 32.38 29.61 2.77  6.52  4.10 2.43
Lazio                            47.88 37.61  10.27 32.53 29.86 2.67  15.35  7.75 7.60
Abruzzo                          41.68 37.93  3.75 34.97 33.40 1.57  6.71  4.53 2.18
Molise                           52.20 44.83  7.37 46.20 41.63 4.57  6.00  3.20 2.80
Campania                       31.56 28.65  2.91 21.50 20.93 0.58  10.06  7.72 2.33
Puglia                           36.17 32.32  3.86 30.98 27.94 3.04  5.19  4.38 0.82
Basilicata                       31.40 29.87  1.53 30.39 28.86 1.53  1.01  1.01 0.00
Calabria                         38.71 33.85  4.86 22.45 21.98 0.47  16.26  11.86 4.39
Sicilia                          34.43 32.45  1.98 26.56 25.21 1.35  7.87  7.24 0.63
Sardegna                         42.73 41.59  1.14 34.64 34.25 0.39  8.09  7.34 0.75
NORTH 39.93 33.27  6.66 33.14 29.19 3.95  6.79  4.08 2.71
CENTRE 41.74 35.20  6.54 31.89 29.75 2.13  9.85  5.44 4.41
SOUTH   35.69 32.69  3.00 27.20 25.83 1.37  8.48  6.86 1.63
ITALY 38.78 33.44  5.34 30.80 28.11 2.69  7.98  5.33 2.65
                       
 
Source: Istat elaborations on Ministry of health data 
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Table 10: Percentage of private "accredited" hospital beds by region - Year 2005 
 
 
REGIONS AND 
GEOGRAPHICAL 
AREAS 
Total For acute care  For long stay and 
rehabilitation
 
Piemonte                         21.34 13.17 49.96
Valle d'Aosta                    0.00 0.00 0.00
Lombardia                        22.40 18.22 44.51
Trentino-Alto Adige             17.91 5.42 66.97
Bolzano-Bozen 14.98 4.75 78.09
Trento 20.51 6.11 61.68
Veneto                           6.12 5.16 11.53
Friuli-Venezia Giulia           12.90 12.09 26.89
Liguria                          1.81 0.76 13.95
Emilia-Romagna                  19.05 12.62 44.49
Toscana                          13.59 10.16 53.92
Umbria                           8.03 7.28 23.02
Marche                           16.77 12.15 46.72
Lazio                            32.06 20.61 74.00
Abruzzo                          16.10 11.95 58.08
Molise                           11.50 7.15 37.97
Campania                         31.86 26.96 80.21
Puglia                           14.35 13.54 21.16
Basilicata                       3.21 3.37 0.00
Calabria                         42.00 35.05 90.37
Sicilia                          22.86 22.30 31.89
Sardegna                         18.93 17.65 65.96
Nord   17.01 12.28 40.68
Centro 23.61 15.47 67.39
Mezzogiorno 23.77 20.98 54.26
ITALIA   20.58 15.93 49.68
       
 
In order to offer a dynamic view, table 11 reports the beds’ trend in the decade after the 
implementation of the Lombardy model: a drastic reduction of acute beds in favour of day 
hospital and rehabilitation is shown. Increasing in day hospital activity is common to many 
regions and follows the national directives on a more appropriate use of hospital admissions. 
The raise in rehabilitation beds indicates the presence of a large number of elderly people and 
people affected by chronic diseases. This last typology of patients is 30% of the whole 
population and is responsible for 70% of health care expenditure (Regole, 2009; Mapelli, 
2005). Acute beds cuts affect almost exclusively public hospitals and can be linked to the 
embedding of smaller hospitals within bigger structures after the law 31/1997. This 
consideration is confirmed by the data reported in the last row of table 10: only public 
hospital firms suffered bed reduction (2,150). These cuts are more than compensated by a 
beds’ increase within IRCCS (2,250). As expected, the entrance in the regional system by   19
accredited hospitals brought new beds, mainly in the geriatric structures, where the presence 
of private and not for profit sector is prominent. The overall balance is positive and totals 
1,130 new beds in the decade 1997-2006. 
 
Table 11: Beds’ trend, Lombardy, 1997-2006 
 
   Public 
hospital firms 
IRCCS   Accredited 
hospitals 
(private/NFP) 
Geriatric hospitals 
(public, NFP, private) 
total 
Acute beds  - 5,000  + 1,200  +50  -600  -4,350  
DH beds  +800  +150  +150  +350  +1,450 
Rehabilitation   +1,700  +700  +20  +900  +3,320 
Rehabilitation -
DH 
+150 +100  +10  +50  +310 
Palliative 
treatment 
+200 +100      +100  +400 
Total -2,150  +2,250  +230  +800  +1,130 
Source: Lucchina and Zangrandi, 2008 
*NFP: not for profit 
 
As a consequence of the central government policy and the reallocation of beds, in the decade 
after the implementation of the Lombardy model, ordinary admissions decreased by 183,900 
while day hospital activity increased its admissions by 111,100, as shown in table 12. 
 
Table 12: Admissions trend, Lombardy, 1997-2006 
 
   Day Hospital  Ordinary admissions 
1997 481,100  1,645,800 
2006 592,200  1,461,900 
diff 111,100  -183,900 
Source: Lucchina and Zangrandi, 2008   20
The flow of patients from other Regions reveals a good quality of hospital services: more than 
10% of services are supplied to individuals from other Regions, with an increase of up to 50% 
for complex treatments, especially in oncologic and cerebrocardiovascular activities 
(Lucchina and Zangrandi, 2008). 
For hospital funding, literature reports many contributes on the use of perspective payment 
and DRG tariffs. As known, if no controls are enacted, this system can drive to some 
distortions, such as excess in surgical interventions (Brenna, 2006), not recommended 
decrease in the length of stay (France et al,, 2005), the specialization of some providers in 
more remunerative and riskless areas, as well as the more diffuse phenomena of cream 
skimming, voluntary up-coding and cherry picking. According to Propper et al, (2006) these 
phenomena exist whether or not competition is enacted, but are intensified with internal 
market for two main reasons: i) the heterogeneity of scopes characterizing each category of 
providers, respectively public, not for profit and private, ii) the need - peculiar to internal 
market - to improve information on quality, that push hospitals to select patients in order to 
show better outcomes. Although Lombardy is one of the few Regions which implemented a 
monitoring system on admissions’ appropriateness, with financial disincentives for hospitals 
showing high rates of inappropriateness, the problems of up-coding and correlates, tightened 
by the presence of providers moved from different incentives, remain difficult to control. A 
recent study on Lombardy’s admissions suggests that private hospitals are more subject to 
cream skimming than not for profit and public ones, there are no significant differences about 
up-coding among the three categories, while not for profit structures present more frequently 
repeated admissions (Berta et al,, 2010). 
 
 
Territorial care – In Lombardy there are 15 LHUs organized in 86 Districts, which are 
smaller divisions responsible for territorial care within their area. Each District manages the 
primary, ambulatory, domiciliary and residential care of about 40,000 people, up to 100,000 
in metropolitan areas. In addition, it controls the supply of services for specific pathologies 
such as HIV, mental diseases, Alzheimer, and other chronic diseases, and is responsible for 
assistance in the detention centres (D’Adamo and Giordano, 2008; Marceca and Orzella, 
2008). Particular attention is devolved to oncology. In 2006 a new oncology net was created 
in order to connect all the providers and singular doctors who do prevention and assist people 
affected by oncologic diseases (IReR, 2010). Largely debated is the issue of the integration 
between hospitals and territory (Longo, 2006): the new regional directives focus on the need 
to increase the territorial network, in order to avoid that patients affected by chronic diseases 
would station in hospitals.. 
 
Primary care - Primary care is carried out by 6,638 general practitioners, with a rate of 0.80 
over 1,000 populations, versus a national rate of 0.91 (data 2007). Figure 3 shows the   21
distribution of this rate among regions: Lombardy is at the second place for minimum number 
of GPs, after Bolzano. For paediatricians, they are 1,122 with a rate of 0.91, still below the 
national value (Figure 4). Despite the importance of these subjects in addressing the demand, 
especially that of elderly people or people affected by chronicle diseases, primary care is not 
particularly developed in Lombardy. Although the last document of regional health planning 
(Regione Lombardia 2007-2009) has tried  to emphasize the role of GP -  pushing toward 
forms of associations on the basis of English Primary Care Groups - only 28% of GPs 
subscribe to any form of association with colleagues (IReR, 2010). Evidence on this topic is 
scarce: some information on primary care setting could be found in IReR, 2008, Heller and 
Tedeschi (2004), Galli and Vendramini (2008). Comparative studies at interregional level are 
furnished by Ceccarelli et al., 2009, and AGENAS, 2009. 
 
 
Figure 3: number of general practitioner over 1,000 residents – year 2007 
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Source: Ministry of Health 
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Figure 4: number of paediatricians over 1,000 residents – year 2007 
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Source: Ministry of Health 
 
 
4.5. Pros and cons of the Lombardy health care system 
 
The analysis of data reported in this section, as well as the evidence examined, enables some 
considerations about the main merits and criticisms of the Lombardy health care system. 
About the former, the control of health care expenditure - either per capita and GDP’s 
percentage values - and the positive balancing, represent the visible result of a decade of 
health care policies structured on this purpose. This objective has been reached without 
deteriorating the quality and appropriateness of health care. The high rate of active mobility 
from other regions - about 10% and up to 50% in some specialties, such as oncology and 
cardiology – confirms the attractiveness of the model. Another positive signal is given by the 
2007 Report of the National Institute of Statistic (Istat, 2007) on patients’ satisfaction about 
their regional health care system. The classification is based on the percentage of people that 
scores the system respectively 1-4, 5-6, 7-10. Residents who think that the Lombardy model 
is scored 1-4 are 11%, compared to an Italian average of 17.2% (standardized rates). Better 
results are shown for Aosta Valley (6.2%), Trento, which however represents an autonomous   23
territorial authority (6.2%), Bolzano, another autonomous territorial authority (7.3%)
13, and 
Tuscany (10.7 %). Lombard people who score their system 5-6 are 41.2%, while 42% of 
residents score it 7-10. Notwithstanding the limits of this kind of surveys, this can be 
considered an additional indication on “above of average” quality of the system. 
On the other hand, limits can be divided into two categories. The first one referring to 
problems structural to the QM setting and the second one highlighting problems peculiar to 
the Lombardy health care system, and therefore more susceptible of improvements. About the 
QM structure, the main contradiction is that of promoting free choice in a context 
characterized by incomplete and asymmetric information. Despite a wide range of services 
supplied, often consumers can’t choose rationally, because they are not fully informed, and 
even if information is available, some of them are not able to accede to it. Other criticisms 
relate to the distortions that the application of fee for service system could encounter with a 
supply provided by both public and private agents. To this extent, risks are twofold: first, if 
the market is open to private providers, they would probably concentrate their activity in 
those areas where financial risk is minor. Lombardy is not free from this behaviour: table 10 
shows a percentage of private beds in acute care of 18% versus a value of 45% in the long 
term care. Even for what is concerning acute care, the financial risk could be shifted toward 
the public sector:  Micossi (2008) reports evidence on patients’ mobility toward public 
hospitals after post admission complications. The second point corroborates these 
considerations and tackles the danger of cream skimming and cherry picking by the private 
sector. A recent study on this issue shows a major cream skimming activity by private 
hospitals (Berta et al., 2010). 
 
Switching to the limits not directly related to the QM orientation, the conflict of competency 
among the Region and LHUs is still very debated, particularly because it let unsolved the 
problem of the scarce rigour in planning volumes and typology of admission by public 
hospitals and the discontinuous use of ex post funding to balance their deficits. The relatively 
high rate of private (out of pocket) financing of health care, is another worrisome issue, which 
requires a more close examination. Possible improvements are auspicated in the field of 
territorial care, especially for the services designated to the elderly and/or chronic patients, in 
order to change the still hospital oriented approach of the Lombardy model. The last issue 
focuses on the necessity of valuing the general practitioner in its fundamental role of 
addressing the patient in its medical pathway. To this extent, the development of forms of 
associative care could drive to improvements both in cost control and health care 
appropriateness. 
 
                                                 
13 To give some parameters, autonomous territorial authorities of Bolzano and Trento have a population of 
respectively 503,000 and 525,000. Aosta Valley population is about 127,000, versus Lombardy population of 
about 9,500,000.   24
5. CONCLUSIONS 
 
This paper represents one of the few attempts to describe and analyse the Lombardy health 
care model as it emerges in its three different declinations: institutional, theoretical and 
applied. Since its formulation, a considerable amount of literature has been produced on the 
Lombardy model and on its quasi market orientation, on the division of roles between Region, 
LHUs and providers, on the competition between private and public sectors, and on the 
LHUs’ purchaser function. Many authors agree on the definition and analysis of the 
characteristics of the Lombardy health care system, as well as on the identification of its 
limits. The quasi market choice, formulated with the regional law 31/1997 embodies the 
regional Government response to a sequence of national reforms carried on during the 
nineteen’s in the health care field.  Competition in the health care sector has driven to a good 
quality of services and health care balance, together with a sharper presence of private sector 
within health care services. To this extent, two kinds of considerations need to be stressed. 
The first one, referred to inpatient care, concerns the financial risk share between public and 
private sector, in a framework of prospective payment regulated by fixed tariffs. The 
prominent presence of private providers in the long-term care suggests that risky areas could 
have been delegated to public providers, letting private sector to specialise within those areas 
where the risk of complications is low and there is boundary for profits. On this issue, more 
investigation is needed. The second point is related to the strict control of health care 
expenditure performed by the Region. Equity issues could arise when observing a gradual 
shift of public financing toward private (out of pocket) spending. 
Though, Lombardy should be given the merit for being the first, and, to a certain extent, the 
only Region to accept and apply the national decrees 502/92 and 517/93, by creating a model 
which encourages competition among providers, promotes patient free choice and supports 
the principle of subsidiarity. With respect to the targets, and notwithstanding the above 
mentioned limitations, the model has been able to maintain a certain degree of coherency, as 
can be observed by analysing the general guidelines of the most recent Regional Health Plan 
(Regione Lombardia, 2007-2009). As mentioned, there is clearly room for improvement in 
various areas, where further investigation, both theoretical and empirical, is recommended. 
   25
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